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This paper is structured as follows: firstly, we motivate and
summarise the expanded evaluation framework,
highlighting three aspects that are deemed to be largely
absent from standard evaluation frameworks, and introduce
its methodological implications. In Section 2, we describe
the use of mixed methods in the case study from Tigray to
investigate the alternative framework’s three new aspects.
Section 3 reflects on the mixing of methods in light of the
alternative evaluation framework. The conclusion provides
lessons learned and presents key operational principles for
evaluating social protection programmes.
1 Proposed new evaluation framework
Most evaluations of social protection programmes have
two limitations, which are arguably a side-effect of the
trend towards making the monitoring and evaluation of
development programmes more ‘rigorous’ and ‘scientific’.
Firstly, they measure a limited set of outcomes – typically
poverty, income, assets, food security, education and
health – that are positive and can be quantified in terms
of measurable changes over time. Secondly, they use a
limited range of methods – with a bias towards large-
scale household surveys administered before and after a
programme is introduced, to beneficiaries and a control
group, to measure statistically significant differences that
can be attributed to the programme. These two factors
are interrelated and mutually reinforcing: the outcomes
that are tracked over time lead towards the selection of a
certain toolkit of methods, but not others, while these
methods are designed to measure a certain set of
outcomes, but not others. As will be shown below, these
omissions can lead to serious misinterpretation of
evaluation findings.
By favouring quantitative methods and quantifiable
outcomes, most evaluations exclude social impacts, and
draw on qualitative methods only to provide quotes and
case studies to endorse and give texture to the
quantitative findings. The alternative framework proposed
in Devereux et al. (2013) argues that impact evaluations
should be extended in three innovative ways.
The first innovation is to recognise that intervention design
choices and implementation processes can directly affect
programme outcomes. For example, how cash transfers are
spent, and their impact on key outcomes such as children’s
nutrition, can be substantially different depending on
whether the cash is delivered to a male household head or
a woman in the same household, because of gendered
differences in spending priorities. Similarly, delivering cash
transfers through electronic mechanisms such as mobile
phones or smart-cards is more efficient, more secure, and
gives beneficiaries more flexibility and access to savings
facilities than manual cash transfer delivery. So switching
from manual to electronic delivery systems can be
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associated with higher proportions of cash transfers being
saved. These factors – changes in efficiency, security,
flexibility and savings behaviour – are not usually considered
in evaluations that examine the impact of cash transfers
purely as incremental household income.
The second extension to standard evaluation approaches is
to incorporate unintended impacts of programmes, both
positive (e.g. empowerment of women) and negative (e.g.
beneficiaries being stigmatised), as well as their effects on
social relations, between individuals within households and
between households within communities. While it is
increasingly recognised that social protection programmes
have social impacts, these are rarely assessed in
randomised control trials (RCTs) or quasi-experimental
evaluations because they are difficult to quantify. This is
important because, for example, if beneficiaries lose
access to informal support from their communities after
they register for a cash transfer programme, this could
effectively reduce the net benefits they receive. Only by
jointly assessing the direct ‘economic’ and indirect ‘social’
impacts of these programmes can their full economic and
social impacts be understood.
The third proposed innovation is to incorporate two
feedback loops into the evaluation framework (see
Figure 1). The first loop – ‘recursive causality’ – recognises
that programmes have multiple impacts and that one
impact can either reinforce or undermine others,
sometimes simultaneously and sometimes sequentially. For
example, if a cash transfer is spent on food this has an
immediate but temporary direct impact on household
food security. Alternatively, if the cash is spent on health
care there is no immediate impact on food security, but if
the beneficiary’s improved health translates into improved
productivity they could produce more food or earn more
income, and there might be a substantial, sustained
positive impact on household food security in the future.
Most evaluations focus on short- to medium-term
changes in key indicators and are not able to assess
impacts that occur over the long term.
The second feedback loop is the ‘deliberate learning’ loop,
whereby results from the monitoring and evaluation are
systematically fed back into improved design and delivery
of the programme. The Productive Safety Net Programme
(PSNP) in Ethiopia offers a relevant example. PSNP
beneficiaries were paid in either food or cash, but
inflation – partly caused by the injection of cash transfers
into weak rural markets – eroded the purchasing power
of cash, so beneficiary preferences shifted against cash.
Since this aspect was being investigated in ongoing
evaluation rounds, this information could be used to
change the payment modality, and more than a million
beneficiaries switched from being paid in cash to being
paid with food (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2010).
Figure 1 illustrates both the ‘standard’ evaluation
framework and the expanded ‘alternative’ approach. In the
‘standard’ approach, social transfers are expected to
generate specific positive economic outcomes (such as
higher income and consumption), which translate into
other positive attributable changes (in nutrition status,
school enrolment, etc.) – the standard impact indicators
reported in evaluation reports. The ‘alternative’ approach
incorporates this theory of change but builds on it by
asserting that social transfers also have impacts on social
dynamics (through how they are targeted or delivered),
which can reinforce or compromise the desired changes.
This expanded framework also recognises that economic
Figure 1 Alternative evaluation framework
Source: Devereux et al. (2013: 14).
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outcomes induced by social transfers can have knock-on
effects on social dynamics (e.g. by generating resentment
by non-beneficiaries towards beneficiaries, which might
undermine informal social support systems).
Figure 1 shows how programme processes underlie all of
these dynamics. They can reinforce or compromise the
extent to which transfers generate economic effects (if
targeting is inaccurate, for instance, effects on poverty will
be small) and they might have unpredictable impacts on
social dynamics (for instance, community-based targeting
may strengthen community solidarity or it may cause
tensions within the community).
The expanded evaluation framework therefore asserts that
any programme’s achievement of desired positive impacts
is mediated and often compromised by programme design
and implementation processes and by social dynamics –
two sets of causal factors that are inadequately recognised
by programme implementers and rarely considered in
impact evaluations. Serious consequences can follow from
these oversights. Failing to recognise how the design and
delivery of a programme can affect its outcomes means
that opportunities to enhance impacts could be missed or,
even worse, that an intervention is judged to have failed
when a simple change (such as delivering resources to
women instead of men) could transform ‘failure’ into
success. Similarly, failing to take social impacts into account
risks overlooking important positive or negative impacts of
an intervention. A programme that achieves its poverty
reduction targets could be damaging to community
cohesion, for example, while a programme that does not
perform well in terms of economic indicators in the short
term might empower women in ways that are important
for overall economic and social wellbeing in the long term.
A ‘learning loop’ allows programmes to be modified to
reflect the important insights that a more holistic
monitoring and evaluation framework will generate.
So the expanded or alternative framework has important
implications for impact evaluations. First, it implies that a
broader range of impacts needs to be assessed, especially
social impacts and intermediate outcomes, and that a
more comprehensive and sophisticated theory of change
should be devised for development interventions. Second,
it follows that a broader range of methodologies and
tools needs to be drawn upon, to assess the more
complex and intangible impacts of social protection
programmes that are not amenable to simple quantitative
measurement of changes ‘before and after’. However, as
will be argued below, this is not an argument for
favouring qualitative methods and rejecting quantitative
methods; instead, it is an argument for a mixed methods
approach that makes full use of the insights that can be
derived from both quantitative and qualitative methods.
2 Mixing methods in evaluating social
protection programmes: an application
The insight that evaluations – or policy research more
broadly – should not be based on a single source of data
or method is not new. Research across the social sciences
has seen a steady expansion of the use of mixed methods,
or so-called ‘q-squared’ methods, in the past decade
(Shaffer 2013), including in the field of impact evaluation.
The adoption of mixed methods is considered as one way
to ensure that an impact study is well contextualised and
policy relevant (White 2008).
Different ways of mixing methods in evaluations have been
identified. Greene, Caracelli and Graham (1997, in Stern et
al. 2012) propose triangulation, complementarity,
development, new start and expansion. Carvalho and White
(1997) identified three ways of mixing methods for policy
research, namely integrating methods; verification,
triangulation and enrichment of findings; and merging
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Box 1 Case study – Social Cash Transfer Pilot
Programme (SCTPP), Tigray, Ethiopia
The SCTPP has three overarching objectives: (1) to reduce
poverty, hunger and starvation in all households that are
extremely poor and at the same time labour constrained;
(2) to increase access to basic social welfare services such
as health care and education; and (3) to generate
information on the feasibility, cost-effectiveness and
impact of a social cash transfer scheme administered by
the local administration. 
? Pilot programme running for a fixed period of two
years
? 2,300 participants
? Monthly cash transfer
? Minimum payment 155 Birr (US$8)
? Targeted to ultra-poor and labour-constrained
households
? Quota on number of eligible households to be
included due to budget constraints
? Community-based targeting 
? Physical payments at pay-point by microcredit
institution (DECSI)
? Provision of complementary services
? Run by Regional Government of Tigray, with support
from UNICEF
? Implemented at community level by Community Care
Coalitions (CCCs), formed by community volunteers.
Source: Berhane et al. (2012a, b).
findings for policy recommendations. Tarrow (2009, in Stern
et al. 2012) offers various tools through which qualitative
and quantitative methods can add value to evaluation,
including process tracing, sequencing of qualitative and
quantitative studies and the use of quantitative data as a
point of departure for qualitative research.
The various typologies on mixing methods point towards
various common elements. Integration and development
of methods includes designing qualitative or quantitative
research instruments based on findings from either
quantitative or qualitative research, deciding on
respondents for qualitative fieldwork based on
quantitative research, deciding on stratification of
quantitative samples based on qualitative fieldwork, and
using qualitative work to pre-test the quantitative survey
questionnaire. Quantitative results can be triangulated
through qualitative research and vice versa. Further,
qualitative work can lead to hypotheses to be tested in
quantitative work and can enrich quantitative findings by
giving answers to the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions. Finally,
findings following the combination of both methods can
generate a comprehensive set of policy recommendations.
These three different ways have all been applied to the
case study presented in this paper, namely the Social Cash
Transfer Pilot Programme (SCTPP) in Tigray, Ethiopia (see
Box 1 for a description of the programme). We reflect on
how methods have been mixed (see Box 2 for a
description of the evaluation design) and particularly on
how this has helped towards gaining an insight into the
three ‘extensions’ that are highlighted in the alternative
evaluation framework. The integration of methods and
verification of findings appear most relevant for the
aspects of programme processes and social dynamics.
Merging of findings for policy recommendations is
particularly pertinent for the element of feedback loops.
Programme processes
Findings on programme processes have been obtained by
both integration of methods and triangulation and
verification of findings across methods. The sequencing of
data collection efforts (see Annex 1 for an overview) gives
rise to particular opportunities for the integration of
methods in this study. With the quantitative baseline
preceding the qualitative baseline fieldwork, it was possible
for preliminary findings to inform the design of qualitative
data collection tools and for the qualitative research to
verify and deepen results from the quantitative survey. In
terms of programme processes, this particularly pertains to
payment processes and targeting procedures. The
availability of both quantitative and qualitative data from a
control group proved to be imperative in understanding
targeting procedures, not only in terms of its efficiency but
also with respect to impacts on social dynamics.
Quantitative results regarding payment processes suggested
that almost half of all programme participants needed more
than three hours to reach their pay-point to collect their
transfers. In order to verify findings and gain further insight
into how participants reached their pay-point, the problems
they faced in travelling to and from the pay-point and how
they dealt with them, follow-up questions were included in
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Box 2 Case study – Evaluation design of SCTPP, Tigray, Ethiopia
Quantitative data and methods: 
? Sample includes a treatment group of 1,630 SCTPP households, a control group of 1,589 households that were
eligible but not included in the programme and a random sample of 446 non-eligible households (to allow for
comparisons with the rest of population).
? Methods for data collection include household-level surveys (at baseline, every four months throughout and
endline) and community surveys (at baseline and endline).
? Techniques for data analysis focus on difference-in-differences based on matching methods and regression
discontinuity design.
Qualitative data and methods: 
? Sample includes 13 programme staff, 23 community members, 31 CCC members, 68 SCTPP participants and 50
SCTPP non-participants.
? Methods for data collection include key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), case studies
(CSs), participatory rural appraisal (PRA) (at baseline and endline).
? Techniques for data analysis focus on the identification of trends and patterns across groups as well as individual
narratives and testimonies.
Source: Berhane et al. (2012a, b).
CDI
the qualitative research. It emerged from the quantitative
findings that half of all programme participants rely on
so-called ‘designated persons’ to collect the cash transfer
on their behalf and that in half the cases this is due to the
long distance to the pay-point. The qualitative fieldwork
confirmed that distance to pay-point was the most
important reason for relying on a designated person and
also revealed particular issues around relying on such
persons. Firstly, the practical procedure for assigning a
designated person was not clear to all participants, leading
to confusion and in some cases prevented participants from
collecting the transfers. Secondly, the reliance on designated
persons gave rise to tensions as payments or other favours
were asked in return for collection of transfers. Both issues
undermine the effectiveness of the SCTPP and may reduce
its impact; participants are less likely to receive their full
transfer amounts, and community tensions may weaken
informal support networks and reciprocal behaviour that are
imperative for local multiplier effects. Findings in Box 3
illustrate the interplay of issues around the use of designated
persons for collection of payments. To ensure continuous
collection of information on this topic through the
remainder of the evaluation, questions on these concerns
were consequently integrated in the monitoring survey.
With respect to targeting procedures, the quantitative
baseline survey found that inclusion errors were low (i.e.
few non-eligible households were included in the SCTPP
as participants). For purposes of verification and further
investigation, particularly with respect to exclusion errors
(i.e. households that are eligible but are not included in the
programme), the qualitative fieldwork included a
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Box 3 Programme processes – findings on payment processes
The use of ‘designated persons’ was most prevalent in Hintalo Wajirat, a rural district that was under-supplied with
pay-points. Less than half of SCTPP beneficiaries collected their cash transfers personally. 
Findings of the quantitative baseline survey on collection of payment
Programme staff identified various difficulties related to the assignment of designated persons and their roles in the
collection of transfers.
‘We observe some difficulties, for example there was a woman who had designated one person and she failed to collect her
payments for two months. Her designator abused the payment and took it for himself. The CCC has accused him in social
court and forced him to pay her.’ (CCC member)
‘Distance to pay-point is not much of a problem for this tabia [sub-district]. Even without transport, they can walk – it is only
one hour. The main problem is the designation issue – old people or disabled people are allowed to designate another person
to collect the money, but they don’t do it officially, they just send someone to Adi Gudum, then DECSI cannot pay them and
the tabia administration can’t help them.’ (Social worker)
Source: (Berhane et al. 2012a).
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
SCTPP A male A female A relative A neighbour Other
beneficiary household household who is not a
member member household
member
household wealth exercise. This exercise asked community
members to identify different wealth categories, formulate
criteria for such categories and group households in their
community according to those categories. The households’
wealth status was subsequently mapped against
programme participation. The situation of households that
were considered eligible for programme participation
based on their wealth status but not included in the
programme, as well as the converse, were discussed in
more detail. This exercise helped to triangulate findings
from the quantitative baseline survey but especially allowed
for understanding perceptions of programme participants,
non-participants and programme staff. Findings confirmed
that inclusion errors were low but also revealed that the
programme suffers from notable exclusion. Interviews with
programme staff revealed these to be a direct result of the
quota imposed on programme participation. They also
pointed towards community tensions resulting from the
imposition of such a quota, as many households not
participating in the programme felt (understandably) that
their exclusion was unfair. Qualitative fieldwork with
respondents from the control group highlighted feelings of
unfairness. Findings in Box 4 illustrate perceptions about
inclusion and exclusion errors.
Unintended impacts
Qualitative and participatory methods are generally better
equipped to provide insight into issues around unintended
impacts, particularly with respect to social dynamics and
effects on stakeholders other than programme participants.
As the SCTPP builds heavily on community involvement and
volunteerism, insight into how the programme impacts on
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Box 4 Programme processes – findings on targeting
Respondents’ answers to the question: ‘Are there any
people who have been included in the SCTPP but are
not eligible?’ suggest that the targeting had been well
done, leaving little possibility of inclusion errors.
‘No, because the selection was carried out based on the
prioritised problems that the poorest came first.’ (CCC
member)
On the other hand, it emerged from responses to the
question ‘Are there any people who are eligible but
excluded from the SCTPP?’ that there are substantial
exclusion errors.
‘Yes. Because of the quota. The total number of eligible
persons in the district is 1,200 but the participants are 749.
So 451 persons are excluded because of the quota.
Prioritised based on their means to support their
households.’ (District official)
‘Yes, in relation to the excluding of eligible households (105
households) because of the quota issue. These households
have considered as if the CCC has deliberately excluded
them and this has created tensions.’ (Social worker)
In response to questions about fairness of the
programme’s selection procedure, opinions were mixed:
‘It is not fair and transparent, because people who are
wealthier than me are participating in the programme.’
(Non-participant in control group)
‘Yes, it is fair, because the targeting has started at grass
roots level, where everybody knows each other’s problems
and potentials.’ (Programme participant)
Source: Berhane et al. (2012a).
Box 5 Unintended impacts – findings on CCCs
In response to questions about decisions for taking on
the role as CCC member and challenges in performing
that role, CCC members answered:
‘There was a tradition among the community to support 
the poor. Based on this tradition the government took the
initiative to establish the CCC and the traditional
cooperation among the community becomes formal.’
(CCC member)
‘Yes, the CCC activities affect our private businesses but we
the CCC members have already decided to assist our people
just like the fighters were doing during the 17 years of struggle.’
(CCC member)
When asked about challenges following the role of
CCCs in the implementation of SCTPP, social workers
highlighted the problems following CCC members’ need
to juggle multiple responsibilities.
‘Most members of the CCC are farmers and do not get
payment for their services in CCC. Being farmers they have
their own activities on their farm, so often you cannot get
them to come to meetings. So we lose participation in CCC
meetings. The major problem faced by the CCC is non-
attendance of committee members at meetings, because
they have their own activities.’ (Social worker)
Source: Berhane et al. (2012a).
local support networks and reciprocal behaviour is
imperative. Qualitative fieldwork was used to elicit opinions
and experiences from programme staff, community
members and members of the CCCs. Findings raised
questions regarding responsibilities and workload of CCC
members and the interplay with sustaining their own
livelihoods and the functioning of the programme.
Group discussions with CCC members revealed that many
regard their work with the CCC as their (religious and moral)
duty and part of their commitment to help the vulnerable
members in their community. Most CCC members consider
it a valuable and positive experience. Programme staff
highlighted the benefits of community engagement in terms
of bottom-up involvement, empowerment and ownership.
Notwithstanding these positive experiences, CCC members
also indicated that the SCTPP-related responsibilities and
activities take up considerable amounts of time and interfere
with daily activities. Programme staff also experienced this to
be a problem, indicating that the clash of SCTPP-related
activities with CCC members’ own livelihood activities makes
them unreliable and difficult to work with. In addition to the
unintended adverse consequences for CCC members and
their livelihoods, the concurrent imperfect implementation
also points towards a broken link in the programme’s theory
of change that undermines its overall impact; links to
complementary services and advice on how to spend the
cash transfers are considered key elements of SCTPP and
CCC members are instrumental in reaching those objectives.
Given findings about unforeseen impacts on CCCs (see Box
5), further questions about the extent of the time burden on
individual CCC members and the scale of the issue will be
included in the quantitative endline survey.
Feedback loops
Insight into the ‘recursive causality’ feedback loop in the
alternative framework is obtained through both integration
of methods and verification of findings. As discussed above,
this feedback loop refers specifically to the ways in which
programme impacts can reinforce or undermine each
other. Programme processes play an important part in this.
An example of a positive loop in the SCTPP refers to the
payment processes. Despite problems with distance to the
pay-point and issues around designated persons,
quantitative findings from the baseline survey and
monitoring surveys show that the large majority of
programme participants do receive their payments on time
and in full. The regularity of full receipt of the payment is
imperative for the programme to maximise its positive
impacts: it instils confidence in programme participants,
supports savings and longer term investment strategies and
induces multiplier effects through positive effects on the
local economy and strengthening of community networks.
The extent of this positive loop is to be further investigated
in the impact assessment based on both the quantitative
and qualitative endline surveys.
The combined analysis of quantitative and qualitative
findings on the receipt of additional services from CCCs
pointed towards a potentially negative feedback loop. As
the SCTPP aims to improve children’s wellbeing with
respect to a range of different outcomes, including
education and health, the provision of additional services is
considered an important element of the programme. It
emerged from the combined analysis of quantitative and
qualitative data that very few participants received other
services from the CCCs and that the few services that are
provided mainly pertain to awareness raising and advice (see
Box 6). The lack of access to additional services undermines
the potential positive impact of SCTPP as transfers may not
be used to their full potential in terms of providing
education, care and support for children, for example.
The integration of methods and verification of data,
particularly on programme processes, provided input for
the ‘deliberate learning’ feedback loop. Findings from the
baseline phase of the programme were reported back to
the Regional Government of Tigray and other
stakeholders during a dissemination workshop, providing
an explicit process that allowed for adjustments of the
programme following identification of challenges or
opportunities. For example, the issues that came to light
with respect to distance to payment point and reliance on
a designated person for the collection of transfers led to
inclusion of more pay-points. The quantitative monitoring
surveys allow for following up on improvements as a
result of the increase of the number of pay-points.
Opportunities for lessons learned to be fed back into
programme implementation are mostly linked to key
dissemination moments planned after the baseline phase,
midway through the programme and at the end of the
programme period (at which point a decision will be
made about the overall future of the programme).
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Box 6 Feedback loops – findings on
complementary services
Quantitative findings from the baseline survey indicated
that only 6% of households received services from their
CCC other than assistance related to SCTPP. Follow-up
questions in the qualitative fieldwork explained this
further. 
‘CCC members teach us to send our children to school in
public meetings and church ceremony. They also promote
sanitation such as dry latrine construction, clothes washing,
etc.’ (Community member)
‘Except in the SCTPP I don’t see any kind of assistance from
the CCC.’ (Programme participant)
Source: Berhane et al. (2012a).
3 Lessons learned
The discussion above clearly shows how the use of
multiple sources of data and methods is useful in providing
insights into the three extensions in the alternative
evaluation framework. The use of a single method – either
quantitative or qualitative, cannot provide comparable
breadth and depth of information. The integration of
methods and verification of findings proved to be
particularly useful for the analysis of programme processes
and social dynamics. In terms of programme processes,
quantitative findings informed the design of qualitative
tools in the baseline phase of the survey and qualitative
fieldwork was used to verify, contextualise and deepen
those quantitative findings. With respect to social
dynamics, results from the qualitative fieldwork pointed
towards new issues that merited further triangulation and
exploration using the quantitative tools in the evaluation’s
monitoring and endline phases. This combined use of
methods also gave insight into the framework’s ‘recursive
causality’ feedback loop in terms of processes and
dynamics that can both undermine and reinforce positive
impacts of the programme. Findings from the quantitative
and qualitative baseline phase were merged to contribute
to the programme’s ‘deliberate learning’ feedback loop.
Despite the benefits and value added as a result of the use
of mixed methods in the evaluation of the SCTPP, we
argue that most common forms of combining methods do
not yet reach far enough. We identify a number of reasons:
? The integration of methods is undertaken in a very
sequential manner, presupposing the extent to which
findings from one method can inform another method.
In the case of the SCTPP evaluation, the quantitative
baseline survey was planned before the qualitative
fieldwork. This allowed for the qualitative tools to be
informed by the quantitative findings but prevented any
qualitative information to be fed into quantitative data
collection.
? Both types of methods used were very structured and
focused in nature, with the main aim to investigate
predetermined hypotheses and research questions. These
hypotheses are strongly informed by the programme’s
‘theory of change’ and the assumed pathways to impact.
Such structured methods are strong in generating
information about those assumed pathways and the
extent to which the programme leads to expected
impacts but is weaker in terms of capturing unforeseen
side effects (positive or negative) or perverse incentives.
? The use of mixed methods in this evaluation was tied to
the programme period and constituted a baseline,
monitoring and endline phase. The endline quantitative
survey and qualitative fieldwork take place around the
time the last cash transfer is provided. Arguably the real
impact of a programme can only be observed well after
the programme has finished; i.e. can any positive
outcomes that were found at the end of the programme
still be observed several years down the line?
4 Conclusion
The lessons learned from the analysis in this paper – based
on both the positive experiences with the use of mixed
methods in the case study from Tigray and the reflection
on its shortcomings – hold a number of implications when
aiming to analyse social protection programmes in line
with the alternative evaluation framework. It follows that:
? The evaluation of social protection programmes needs
to draw upon a broad range of methodologies and
tools. This is necessary for triangulation and verification
of findings as well as for providing depth and texture to
the analysis.
? Research methods should include a mix of both
structured and more exploratory approaches, particularly
to explore and capture unforeseen side-effects and assess
the more complex and intangible impacts of social
protection programmes that are not amenable to simple
quantitative measurement of changes ‘before and after’.
? Evaluations of social protection programmes should
integrate qualitative and quantitative research from the
moment of its design through to analysis and write-up,
allowing for more ‘cross-fertilisation’ between methods
than possible in the case of rigid sequencing of data
collection and analysis.
? The use of control groups and panels is vital across all
tools and methods, and should not be exclusive to
collection of quantitative data. Experiences and opinions
of those not participating in the programme can
provide crucial insight into programme processes,
unintended impacts and factors undermining or
strengthening pathways to impact that may not be
obtained from participants. The inclusion of their voices
in the ‘deliberate learning’ feedback loop is of
importance for both instrumental and moral reasons.
? Data collection and research efforts should extend
beyond the time span of the social protection
programme. Whilst data collection in the endline phase
of an evaluation allows for assessing outcomes at the
close of the programme, a programme’s real impact
can only be assessed several years afterwards, when
outcomes lead to impacts.
In sum, the use of mixed methods in evaluating social
protection programmes is undoubtedly preferred to the
application of a single tool or method. However, an
extension of the range of impacts to be evaluated, as
proposed in the alternative framework for social
protection programmes, needs to go hand in hand with
similar innovative extensions in the ways in which
methods are mixed.
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Note
1 We would like to thank Barbara Befani and Chris Barnett for
their helpful comments, from which this paper has greatly
benefited.
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Annex 1
Table 1 Overview quantitative and qualitative data collection
Quantitative Quantitative Quantitative Qualitative 
household community monitoring data 
survey survey survey collection
2012 May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
2013 January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
2014 January
February
March
April
May
June
July
baseline
monitoring
endline
“[A]ny programme’s achievement of desired positive impacts is mediated and often compromised byprogramme design and implementation processes and by social dynamics – two sets of causal factors that areinadequately recognised by programme implementers and rarely considered in impact evaluations… a broader
range of methodologies and tools needs to be drawn upon, to assess the more complex and intangible impacts
of social protection programmes”
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